Multinational enterprises frequently start, acquire, close and divest a¢liates. There is a large literature on restructuring, which focuses on start-ups and acquisitions. The empirical literature on plant survival usually provides evidence from a single country. In contrast, this paper uses detailed survey data of Swedish multinationals to examine the characteristics that result in plant divestiture at the a¢liate, …rm, industry, country and regional level. We provide propositions drawn on a straightforward model from Berg et al (2012) in which the primary motive to divest an a¢liate is to …nance other investments in the network of the MNC. In line with conclusions from our model, we …nd that larger a¢liates are more likely to be divested and these a¢liates are small relative to the other operations of the …rm in the same country or region. We also …nd that divestiture begets divestiture, but acquisition does not, thus casting doubt on the notion of footloose multinationals. Several …rm, industry and country characteristics also matter.
Introduction
Traditional theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) shed light on trade and FDI ‡ows, but they do not adequately address the fundamental issue of internalization which includes not only entry and exit but also the organizational form of a multinational corporation (MNC) across borders. In recent years, the literature has started …lling this void and has brought in tools from the theory of the …rm to study the boundaries of multinational …rms. 1 Concurrently, as once unavailable, rich, plant/…rm level survey data became available, we have seen a tremendous extension of micro data work exploring the behavior of multiplant …rms in the US, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Portugal, Turkey, Indonesia and many others. Yet, there remains a gap in the existing empirical literature about the organization of multinational …rms across boundaries, in particular about the decisions of multinationals to divest a¢liates.
The dominance of MNCs in international trade and their presence in labor markets require a careful analysis of divestiture from di¤erent markets all around the world. There are at least two reasons to study plant sales of multinational corporations: (i) To understand why and how a multinational restructures its operations globally (Even though divestiture is a big part of restructuring, the literature heavily emphasizes acquisitions), (ii) To understand the impact of multinational restructuring on host economies. When foreign a¢liates exit a country due to a shift of investment to another, the major policy challenge for that country is to maintain its relative attractiveness for FDI. This is especially important for investment that does not involve high sunk costs, and is thus more footloose in nature.
This paper studies the decision of a multinational …rm to divest a foreign plant. This decision must be seen in the context of the …rm's complex location strategies that involve all possible locations. Multinational a¢liate divestiture is the result of a plethora of factors, some external and some internal to the …rm. Some plant sales are a product of relocation of activities to lowcost production sites in order to cut costs in increasingly competitive world markets. Some are spurred by changes in the economic environment, which can a¤ect speci…c industries. For example, in industries associated with the product life-cycle, plant divestitures may occur as a result of massive concurrent exits when the activity reaches maturity. Other sales are motivated by strategic considerations such as a decision to focus on core business and divest from non-core activities. Plant sales also take place when multinationals merge: some operations are eliminated to avoid duplication and to achieve the cost savings that often drive mergers in the …rst place.
A primary motive in the theoretical part of this paper to divest an a¢liate is to …nance other investments in the MNC's network. We adapt the model of Berg, Norbäck and Persson (2012) , who analyze mergers and acquisitions with …nancial constraints, to a setting whith a given buyer and seller. The main assumption in their model is that …nancial constraints a¤ect …rms' cost of capital which, in turn, a¤ects their ability to conduct investment after an ownership transfer. We examine an MNC with two a¢liates which di¤er in quality. Each a¢liate/…rm produces a good under monopoly. At the outset, the MNC wishes to invest in order to increase its productive e¢ciency. Since …nancing costs increase in external borrowing, the MNC cannot …nance investment to improve both a¢liates. It can, however, reduce its costs for external …nancing by selling one of its a¢liates, since this increases its cash holdings. At lower borrowing costs, the MNC will be able to invest and restructure the remaining a¢liate. There is also another (foreign) …rm which can potentially acquire one of the a¢liates. Which a¢liate is sold o¤ and under what price is then determined through Nash-bargaining between the …rms.
This simple model generates two distinct results: (i) The MNC can only sell an a¢liate if the a¢liate has su¢ciently high quality assets. (ii) Given that both a¢liates have assets of su¢cient quality, the …rms will agree to a deal where the MNC sells the a¢liate which has the lowest quality assets among its other a¢liates. If we assume that the quality of a¢liate assets is correlated with the size of an a¢liate, the …rst result implies that an MNC will only be able to sell an a¢liate with su¢cient size; but among the a¢liates that have su¢cient size, it will sell the smallest.
We then take these predictions to the data using con…dential Swedish MNC data. The survey data of Swedish multinationals is uniquely suited to shedding more light on divestitures because it provides information along several important dimensions at the plant, the …rm and the country level. In the 2003 survey, …rms were speci…cally asked about plant divestitures and closures during the previous …ve years, as well as about start-ups and acquisitions. Moreover, they are asked to provide a complete list of a¢liate operations worldwide, including Sweden. This enables us to investigate the decision to divest an a¢liate in the context of the entire network of operations of the …rm.
We do indeed …nd that larger a¢liates as measured by employment are more likely to be divested. As expected, we do also …nd that when an a¢liate increases in size relative to the size of other a¢liates of the …rm in the same country or region, the likelihood of being divested decreases. In addition, when adding variables which capture the global network of the …rm, we …nd that the existence of more and geographically close a¢liates increases the likelihood of divestiture. Finally, plant sales elsewhere increase the probability of divestiture, but acquisitions elsewhere, regardless of whether at the country, regional or global level, do not. This result counters the "footloose" multinationals argument.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses the recent literature on a¢liate exit which lacks an analysis of divestitures. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 lays out the empirical analysis and gives detailed descriptions of a¢liate, …rm, industry and country level variables used in the estimations. Section 5 reports the empirical results which are followed by conclusions.
Previous literature
The determinants of entry and exit dynamics of …rms have been a lively area of theoretical and empirical research. The seminal theoretical analyses such as Nelson and Winter (1982) , Jovanovic (1982) , Hopenhayn (1992) , and Ericson and Pakes (1995) have helped shape the recent empirical work which was made possible by the availability of panel data on …rms/plants in the last couple of decades. A great deal of stylized facts emerged from these empirical papers on the role of heterogeneous …rms, international trade, foreign ownership, product markets, …rm structure, geography and agglomeration in the survival and exit of plants. 2 Firstly, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) and Dunne, Klimek and Roberts (2005) emphasize the role of plant size as one of the determinants of plant exit. The selection models of Jovanovic (1982) or Pakes and Ericson (1998) suggest that newly born plants go through a process of learning including but not limited to acquiring capital, training the workforce, and establishing distribution networks. Small plants may not have easy access to labor, capital or resource markets, which in turn may increase their operating costs and force them to exit earlier than a larger …rm. Therefore, as plants get older and bigger they are more likely to remain. There is an abundance of work con…rming these …ndings. 3 Secondly, producing multiple products plays an important role in determining plant survival. Multiproduct plants are larger and more productive than single-product …rms. For example, Dunne et al. (1989) …nd that while 59% of …rms produce a single product, multiproduct …rms account for 91% of output in a sector. Moreover, there are sunk costs associated with producing multiple products which reduces the incumbent competition and thus the probability of plant exit. Bernard and Jensen (2007) …nd supporting evidence for this argument.
Thirdly, survival probability of a recently acquired plant is ambiguous. The acquisition can be a bad match or it may have been intended to allow the …rm to reduce the capacity in the industry (horizontal acquisition). If the plant is acquired to strengthen the already existing plants of the parent through forward or backward linkages (vertical acquisition) then the odds of survival increase. Bernard and Jensen (2007) …nd that recently acquired plants are more likely to be closed.
Lastly, plant level productivity is an important determinant of plant exit. The recent heterogeneous …rm models in international trade (Melitz, 2003 and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003) and their antecedents (Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes, 1995 and Olley and Pakes 1996) all predict that low productivity plants are more likely to exit the industry.
In light of this earlier literature our paper's contributions are twofold: (i). While earlier work almost uniformly emphasizes plant exit, our data demonstrate the overwhelming importance of plant sales, in other words, divestitures, rather than complete shut-downs. Therefore, in this paper, we are able to investigate multinational divestiture dynamics. (ii). Di¤erent from the existing empirical work we are able to explore the global restructuring of multinational …rms. Earlier work explores the exit of multiplant or multinational …rms in one country. Granted, multiplant and multinational …rms have many common traits, but they are not the same. Many multinational …rms have operations in numerous countries, but also frequently start up or acquire new a¢liates as well as close or divest existing ones. Unlike many national …rms that exit the market altogether, multinational …rms sell or close plants even as their operations expand at home, in other countries and frequently even in the country of the a¢liate in question. While there is a considerable literature on the determinants of plant location and the scope of a …rm's operations abroad, relatively little is known about the determinants of a …rm's decision to abandon a plant in a particular location, either via closure or divestiture. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature.
Theory
The model is a simpli…ed version of Berg et al. (2012) . Consider two …rms, H and F . Firm H is a multinational …rm which has two a¢liates, a 1 and a 2 . These a¢liates may be located in the same host country or in separate host countries. There is also a foreign …rm, F . For the sake of simplicity, the foreign …rm is assumed to have only one a¢liate f: 4 Berg et al. (2012) analyze mergers and acquisitions with …nancial constraints. The main assumption is that …nancial constraints a¤ect …rms' cost of capital which, in turn, a¤ects their ability to conduct investment after an ownership transfer. As shown in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , the capital cost is higher under external …nancing due to information, agency or risk aversion problems. For instance, if …rm F buys a¢liate a 1 , this will reduce its cash holdings. The reduction in cash holdings will increase its investment cost as it will be more costly for …rm F to …nance new investments (as lenders will demand a higher interest rate). In contrast, …rm H, the seller of a¢liate a 1 , will see an increase in its cash holdings, which reduces its borrowing costs for new investments.
In the remainder of the section the following timing of events is assumed: In the …rst stage …rm H can sell one of its a¢liates to …rm F . In the second stage, …rms decide on whether to make an investment in a new asset k to reduce their costs. The third and …nal stage is the product market interaction.
To highlight the main mechanisms and get predictions for our empirical analysis of divestitures of the a¢liates of Swedish MNCs, we will further simplify Berg et al. (2012) . Firm H decides on whether or not to sell and …rm F decides whether or not to buy. Due to the sale of one of its a¢liates, …rm H increases its cash holdings and invests in a signi…cant improvement of the remaining a¢liate. Financing costs are assumed to be too high to improve both a¢liates. On the other hand, since the acquisition reduces Firm F 's cash holdings, Firm F cannot make such an investment.
In the next three subsections, we analyze under what conditions …rm H will sell an a¢liate to …rm F and which of the two a¢liates is sold. We rule out that …rm H sells both a¢liates, as the Swedish MNCs to remain in the data set need to have at least one producing a¢liate (i.e. remain an MNC). To shed more light on the mechanisms, we assume that each a¢liate holds a monopoly and that there are no network e¤ects or spillovers between a¢liates or competition e¤ects between …rms. We discuss a relaxation of these assumptions below.
Stage 3: Product market
The set of …rms in the industry is Z = fH; F g and the set of a¢liates is A =fa 1 ; a 2 ; a f g. Let the action of an a¢liate a j 2 A be x a j . Let l a j denote the ownership of the a¢liate a j where l a j = fh; f g. Here, h is used to indicate that an a¢liate is owned by …rm H and f is used to indicate that an a¢liate is owned by …rm F . Let a j (x a j ;l a j ) be the variable pro…t in an a¢liate a j when the ownership of a¢liates is l a j and the a¢liate action is x a j . From the simplifying assumption of monopoly, a j (x a j ;l a j ) = P a j c a j (l a j ) Q a j ; where P a j = Q a j is the inverse demand. P a j is the price of the product made by a¢liate a j , Q a j is its output and c a j (l a j ) is the marginal cost under the ownership l a j . The …rst-order condition is P a j c a j (l a j ) =Q a j from which we have the optimal output and reduced-form pro…t for a¢liate a j as usual:
Stage 2: Investment
At this stage, …rm H decides whether or not to invest in a marginal cost reduction in a¢liate a j at cost G . Formally, we assume that:
where c a j (l j j ) is the marginal cost in a¢liate a j when the cost reducing investment is made and c a j (l a j j0) is the marginal cost when no investment is made. Here, k a j > 0 represents the investment in …rm-speci…c assets (such as human capital of employees, patents, blueprints and procedures) which provide cost savings to the …rm. As noted, we study …rm H's decision to sell an a¢liate and we assume that only a su¢cient increase in cash-holdings allows a …rm to invest in new …rm-speci…c assets in order to signi…cantly reduce its marginal cost. To capture this, let G z (l a 1 ; l a 2 ) be the investment cost for …rm z. We then assume that
Part (i) formalizes that investment costs are lower for …rm H if it sells an a¢liate. Again, this mirrors the assumption that …nancing is less costly when …rm H sells one of its a¢liates and increases its cash holdings (assuming a positive sales price which will be shown to hold below).
Part (ii) says that …rm F as the buyer of one of …rm H's a¢liates will have a higher investment cost. Again, this arises because when paying a positive acquisition price, …rm F faces a reduction in its cash holdings and therefore an increase in its …nancing costs. We further assume that
Thus, …rm H can always …nance an investment in its remaining a¢liate if it sells the other a¢liate and cannot invest in both plants at the same time. We also assume that
Firm F as the acquirer will see a reduction in its cash holdings which makes it impossible to invest in a cost reducing asset.
Finally, …rm F incurs a transaction cost T when buying the a¢liate. An acquisition is potentially pro…table if and only if a j (f j0) T > 0; j = f1; 2g. In order for a foreign acquisition of a¢liate a 1 or a 2 to be potentially pro…table, the product market pro…t under an acquisition a j (f j0) must exceed the transaction cost associated with a deal, T .
Stage 1: Divestment decision
We start our analysis by outlining the details of two cases: Divestment of a¢liate a 1 and divestment of a¢liate a 2 . To proceed, let z (l 1 ; l 2 ) = X l j 2z a j (l j j:) be the aggregate product market pro…t for …rm z, where (l 1 ; l 2 ) is the vector of ownership of the a¢liates a 1 and a 2 .
A¢liate a 1 is divested Given Assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation over the sale of a¢liate a 1 is:
where F (f; h) = a 1 (f j0) + a f (f j0) is the aggregate variable pro…t for …rm F when …rm F buys a¢liate a 1 , F (h; h) = a f (f j0) is the aggregate variable pro…t of …rm F when no acquisition takes place (status quo pro…t), H (f; h) = a 2 (f j ) G is the variable pro…t for …rm H when it sells a¢l-iate a 1 and invests in upgrading in its remaining a¢liate a 2 . Finally,
is the status quo pro…t for …rm H. Here, stands for the bargaining power of …rm F . The associated acquisition price of a¢liate a 1 is given as S 1 = arg max S a 1 (S); or:
From (3), it is then useful to de…ne
as the net gain for …rm F from agreeing to buy a¢liate a 1 at price
as the net gain for …rm H from agreeing to sell a¢liate a 1 at price S 1 : Inserting the acquisition price S 1 from (4) in R z (h; f ), we obtain:
where (f; h) = F (f; h)+ H (f; h) is the aggregate pro…t when …rm H sells a¢liate a 1 at S 1 and
is the aggregate pro…t when no deal is made.
A¢liate a 2 is divested Given assumptions 1-4, the Nash-Bargaining product in a negotiation over a sale of a¢liate a 2 is:
In (6),
is the aggregate variable pro…t net of the transaction cost when …rm F buys a¢liate a 2 , F (h; h) = a f (f j0) is again the aggregate variable pro…t or …rm F when no deal takes place. H (h; f ) = a 1 (f j ) G is now the aggregate variable pro…t net of the investment cost for …rm H when it sells a¢liate a 2 and upgrades its a¢liate a 1 , and …nally,
hj0) is the status quo pro…t for …rm H.
The associated acquisition price of a¢liate a 2 , S 2 = arg max S a 2 (S), is then:
As above, de…ne
as the net gain for …rm F from agreeing to buy a¢liate a 2 at price
as the net gain for …rm H to sell a¢liate a 1 at price S 2 . Inserting the acquisition price S 2 in (7) in R z (h; f ) we obtain:
where
G is the total aggregate pro…t when …rm H sells a¢liate a 2 at S 2 to …rm F , and (h; h) = F (h; h) T + H (h; h) is the aggregate pro…t when no deal is made.
When does a divestiture occur and which a¢liate is divested?
To guide the empirical analysis, we investigate whether …rm H divests an a¢liate and if so which a¢liate is sold. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the quality of a¢liate assets a 1 and a 2 are such that k a 2 > k a 1 . Then, (i) …rm F will only agree to buy a¢liate a j if the quality of its assets k a j are su¢ciently high, i¤
If both a¢liates have a su¢ciently high quality k a j > k min , …rm H and …rm F will agree on a divestiture of a¢liate a 1 which has the lowest asset quality.
Let us …rst prove Proposition 1(i). 5 Note that Firm F must obtain a positive net pro…t from acquiring a¢liate a j at a zero price at S j = 0 in order to have an incentive to buy the a¢liate (ruling out negative prices). This net pro…t is
From (1) and (2), a strictly positive net pro…t
Intuitively, in order to cope with the transaction cost inherent in an acquisition, the quality of the acquired assets must be su¢ciently high.
Let us then prove Proposition 1(ii). Note that from (5) and (8) both …rm H and …rm F will prefer a divestment of the a¢liate which gives the largest increase in aggregate pro…t. Both …rms agree that it is in their interest to have …rm H sell a 1 if and only if this will give rise to a higher aggregate pro…t than the sale of a¢liate a 2 , (f; h)> (h; f ).
We can rewrite the latter condition as follows:
Thus, aggregate pro…t will be higher if …rm H sells a¢liate a 1 and then invests in a¢liate a 2 . This happens because the quality of the assets in a¢liate a 2 is, by assumption, higher, k a 2 > k a 1 . To see this, it is instructive to di¤erentiate (f; h)
In short, larger cost savings when investing in the larger a¢liate a 2 …nanced from selling a 1 create the larger increase in aggregate pro…t. Since each …rm gets a …xed share of this increase, both …rms will prefer the divestiture of a 1 .
Finally, it is also interesting to explore how …rm F is able to bene…t despite agreeing not to buy the best a¢liate. To see how, rewrite the acquisition price for a¢liate a 1 as follows:
Firm F obtains a 1 (f j0) T in net pro…t from buying a¢liate a 1 which from (12) implies a rebate on the acquisition price since S 1 < a 1 (f j0) T . The rebate is larger the larger is the increase in variable pro…t for …rm H from investing in a¢liate a 2 ,
Discussion and Extensions
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we brie ‡y discuss major results and some extensions of the model. The …rst result arises from the assumption of a transaction cost to be paid by the acquirer: unless the quality of the a¢liate's assets are su¢ciently high, there will be no surplus for the buyer and hence no incentive to negotiate a deal. The second result is a direct consequence of the assumption that …nancing costs are a¤ected by wealth or cash holdings: selling an a¢liate reduces the costs for external …nance which enables the MNC to invest in the remaining a¢liate. We then show that if the investment increases, this reduces marginal cost and the MNC will sell the a¢liate with assets of lower quality and then with cash received invest in the a¢liate with assets of higher quality. This produces the largest gain in pro…ts since the reduction in marginal cost a¤ects more units in the larger a¢liate. The buying …rm will also agree to this deal, as the larger gain for the MNC from investing in the a¢liate of higher quality will be mirrored by a lower acquisition price.
It is straightforward to extend the model to more than two a¢liates. Let the set of …rms be Z = fH; F g and the set of a¢liates be A =fa 1 ; ::a t :::; a N ; a f g where …rm H initially owns a¢liates fa 1 ; ::; a t ; :::; a N g, where each a¢liate is a monopoly. Firms will then negotiate a price S at for a¢liate a t . As in (8) , each potential deal will give rise to a net-pro…t for each …rm which will be the status quo pro…t plus a share of the increase in aggregate pro…t when a¢liate a t is sold (where the share is given by the bargaining strength). Firms will agree on the price which gives rise to the largest increase on aggregate pro…ts. With a transaction cost present, a¢liate a j needs to be associated with a su¢ciently high quality of its assets k a j in order to give …rm F an incentive to participate in the deal, in line with Proposition 1(i). However, it will also be the case that when the quality k a j increases even further, it is more likely that …rm H will keep a¢liate a j and sell another a¢liate, as it will be better to invest into an a¢liate with higher quality assets in order to get a larger bene…t from the investment, in line with Proposition 1(ii). This would be true even if we allowed for multiple sales of a¢liates.
With several a¢liates in a network we could also introduce synergies or network e¤ects. Also in this setting, there must be an incentive for the buyer to participate: to be sold, the quality of the assets must again be su¢ciently high. The seller will also invest in the a¢liate that gives the highest synergy or strongest network e¤ects. Through the Nash-Bargaining process, the buyer and seller would coordinate the outcome that increases aggregate pro…t the most. This implies that an a¢liate with better quality assets or assets with the potential to generate larger synergies will not be sold. As shown in Berg et. al. (2012) , this will be true even in a setting with product market competition, since the acquisition price will adjust to take into account how …rms are a¤ected in the post-acquisition market. 6 
Empirical analysis
There are several empirical implications emanating from the model. This subsection enumerates these. The assets, denoted by k a j in the model, are proprietary (or …rm-speci…c) assets which represent knowledge about how to produce a cheaper or better product. This knowledge could take the speci…c form of a patented process or it might simply rest on know-how shared among the employees of multinational …rms. In the MNC literature, the size of operations and extensiveness of these …rms-speci…c assets have proven to be highly correlated (Caves, 2007) . Therefore, we will use a¢liate/…rm size as an indicator of the quality of …rm-speci…c assets owned by the …rm. Proposition 1(i) then suggests that an a¢liate is more likely to be divested when it increases in size: if an a¢liate is too small and thus has low quality assets, its purchase will not give the acquirer a positive net return due to the transaction cost T . Moreover, Proposition 1(ii) shows that given that an a¢liate is su¢ciently large it will still be relatively small within the MNC's network to be a candidate for divestment. The intuition here is that when the MNC sells an a¢liate in order to get resources to invest in another a¢liate, it will obtain the highest return when investing in the a¢liate with higher quality assets.
These results produce a tension between the e¤ect of larger a¢liate size on the divestment decision: One the one hand, a larger a¢liate becomes a more likely candidate for a divestiture as size indicates that the quality of the assets inherent in the a¢liate is su¢cient to induce the acquirer to participate in a deal despite the transaction costs. One the other hand, if a larger a¢liate size indicates higher quality assets, the MNC has an incentive to invest in that a¢liate, making it less likely that the MNC would want to sell it.
We attempt to capture these two opposing e¤ects of a¢liate size on the divestment decision using the following probit estimation model:
where (:) is the normal distribution, size a j is the size of an a¢liate and rel_size a j is the af…liate's size relative to other a¢liates in the network, below de…ned as rel_size a j = Af f iliate size=(Af f iliate average size). Proposition 1(i) suggests that 1 > 0 as a¢liates require a minimum quality to be eligible for a deal. Proposition 1(ii) suggests that the MNC's sell their smaller a¢liates that pass the minimum size. In order to capture this implication of the model, we calculate a relative a¢liate size measure whose value increases when the a¢liate becomes a larger one relative to other a¢liates in the MNC's network and thus we expect 2 < 0. That is, an increase in relative size reduces the likelihood of the a¢liate being sold. We now turn to a description of our data used to estimate (13) as well as a discussion of additional control variables expected to a¤ect the likelihood of divestiture.
Data
The core data come from surveys of Swedish multinational …rms conducted by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN). These surveys were conducted in regular intervals since 1965, with the last one in 2003. 7 The survey provides detailed information on the operations of these …rms in Sweden and abroad. It is unique in a number of ways. It provides a wealth of detailed information on sales, inputs, trade, etc. It also asks about any foreign a¢liates and provides information for each a¢liate as well as the economic relationship between the parent and the a¢liate. 7 With many Swedish multinationals now foreign-owned, the surveys were discontinued. Tables 1 and 2 . Of those, 228 were acquired or started-up and 110 were closed or divested since 1998. 8 Our dependent variable Divest a j takes on the value of one for each a¢liate that was closed or divested and zero otherwise. In practice, only one a¢liate was reported closed, all others were divested. 9 Similarly, most new a¢liates were acquired, very few were started-up. For more details about the survey in general, see Ekholm and Hesselman (2000) . For the 2003 survey, see Hakkala and Zimmermann (2005) .
We supplement the survey data with industry and country level data from various sources. The industry level minimum e¢cient scale data come from Statistics Sweden and report sales, employees, the number of …rms and other data for two-digit industries in Sweden. We have data on regulations, that vary by industry and country from the OECD, as collected by and described in detail in Conway and Nicoletti (2006) . Data on GDP, labor and capital at the country level come from the Penn World Tables. Education data is from Barro and Lee (2010 update).
We now describe our variables in detail.
A¢liate-level variables
We start with the core variables, size a j and rel_size a j ; that we are interested in from the theory.
A¢liate size: Ideally, size a j in equation (13) should be measured by quantity produced or sold. However, consistent information on these variables is not available in the data set. Therefore, we proxy size by the current number of employees L a j for surviving a¢liates and the number of employees at the time of exit for those that are divested. We use this variable in logarithmic scale since a¢liates vary considerably in size:
where L a j is the number of employees in a¢liate a j . A potential concern with measuring a¢liate quality k a j in terms of the log employment size log(L a j ), is the labor saving e¤ect of asset quality: one might worry that a-iates with higher quality assets may generate large sales but then have very few employees. We do not believe this to be a large problem for a number of reasaons. Even in the simple monopoly, the number of workers can increase in asset quality. To see this, note that the number of workers in an a¢liate before a divestiture or investment is L a j (z) = c k a j Q a j (z). It can be shown that if the marginal cost is su¢ciently low, c 2 (k a j ; k a j + 1 2 ), a¢liate employment L a j (z) increases in k a j . Note also that all results remain the same if we 8 Unfortunately, only 261 can be linked to at least some information from prior surveys, thus constraining the use of other a¢liate and …rm level control variables. 9 Results do not change when that a¢liate is omitted from the analysis.
assumed that consumers' willingness to pay is P a j = + k a j Q a j and that marginal cost is c a j = c; in particular, Proposition 1 still holds. Then, since there is an increase in output resulting from higher asset quality, a¢liate employment L a j (z) will always increase in the quality of the assets k a j as well.
Whether or not asset quality indeed increases employment is an empirical question. We checked this by running regressions of the log of a¢liate sales, log(P aj Q a j ) on the log of a¢liate employment log(L a j ) using a¢liate …xed e¤ects, country-industry pair …xed e¤ects and numerous other speci…cations making use of the other survey years (which lack the divestiture information on a¢l-iates, but have sales). These regressions consistently produce a positive and statistically signi…cant elasticity ranging from 0.6 to 1. A sign…cant, strictly positive elasticity of sales with respect to employment, El La j P aj Q a j , suggest that asset quality k a j drives both sales and employment, as suggested by the theory, and, therefore, that we can use a¢liate employment to proxy for a¢liate asset quality.
A¢liate relative size: Now we turn to rel_size a j in equation (13) . Since it is not obvious how to measure relative size, we will do it several di¤erent ways.
First, we measure rel_size as the size of the a¢liate relative to average a¢liate size of the …rm, in log terms,
where P a j 2z L a j is the total number of employees in a¢liates of …rm z and A z is the total number of a¢liates of …rm z. This measure adjusts for general size di¤erences among …rms. If exp(rel_size a j ) is greater than 1, then the a¢liate is larger than average. Alternatively, we consider the share of the a¢liate's employment in total a¢liate employment in the country (m) or region (r),
Irrespective of whether we calculate the size share in the host country or host region, the size share variable takes values between 0 and 1 naturally. As it gets closer to 1, the relative importance of the a¢liate in the host country or in the host region increases for the …rm.
Firm-level variables
A¢liate size, size, and a¢liate relative size, rel_size or a¢liate size share, size_share, are the core variables in our analysis. These variables are generated from our theoretical model. To assess the robustness of these varaiables, we will also add a number of control variables. We …rst complement these variables with information on the …rm's network of a¢liates and other characteristics of the mother …rm. Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the data. It shows the network of …rm z. Firm z is active in the home country and in four foreign countries, distributed over two regions. Firm z has …ve a¢liates distributed over the four countries. We now turn to how we calculate di¤erent …rm level variables for the …rms in the data.
Other A¢liate(s): It may be the case that the probability of divestiture is higher for plants with geographically close or in …rms with a greater number of other a¢liates. Concentrating production in fewer plants may allow a …rm to better exploit plant level scale economies. Moreover, when other plants are present in the same market, some divestiture does not equal leaving a market altogether. 
Number of Other A¢liates:
Rather than an indicator variable, we use the number of other a¢liates of …rm z in the same country/region, namely num_othaf f zm and num_othaf f zr .
Other Acquisitions:
A …rm can also restructure its operations by switching sectors or acquiring plants at the same time others are closed down or divested. This can happen in the same host country, in the same host region or anywhere in the world.
Related recent empirical studies conducted in the single country framework are Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2008 Greenaway et al. ( , 2009 ). The former authors consider the decision to cease production or switch sectors following being exposed to higher competition from low wage countries. They …nd that …rms with low capital and skill levels are less likely to survive in the face of increased competition from abroad and …rms switch to more capital and skill intensive sectors when exposed to lower levels of foreign competition. The latter authors consider …rm choices between alternative exit strategies, namely, closedown, switching sectors or being acquired, using a multinomial probit model.
To assess the importance of whether or not having entry elsewhere, in the form of an acquisition or a start-up within the same …rm z, a¤ects a¢liate a, we consider a dummy variable at the country, 
Acquiring or opening a plant in another country could signal an intention to relocate production, for example to a lower-cost location, attesting to the 'footloose' nature of multinationals. It is also consistent with the spirit of the model. Since an acquisition depletes cash reserves and thus increases the …nancing constraint and prevents investing in existing a¢liates, it should raise the probability of divestiture of another a¢liate in order to ease the constraint and enable investments.
Other Divestiture(s):
In the model, we could have multiple divestitures (as long as not all a¢liates are sold). However, the model is too simple to capture the entire set of dynamics which link multiple divestitures. We also note that in this paper the e¤ect of divestitures or exits in other regions or countries has not been examined in the single country framework of previous literature. To control for these, we de…ne a dummy variable for other divested a¢liates within the same …rm z, again at the country, regional and global level, Controlling for other divestitures is important as …rms often face negative shocks that a¤ect multiple plants similarly. As a result, closures or divestitures are likely to be correlated across the …rm's a¢liate network. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) o¤er a complementary explanation for a positive correlation of the existence of a¢liates within a country. They …nd evidence of what they call intra-industry vertical FDI. At the four-digit industry level, there exist a¢liates of an MNC that produce specialized inputs for other a¢liates in the same industry, thus making it more likely for an a¢liate to be divested when there are other divestments. P a j Q a j and z = P m; P a j 2zm;
P a j Q a j denote the foreign and global sales of …rm z, respectively. A higher value indicates a higher degree of dependence on international markets.
Labor Productivity:
As has been shown in the burgeoning literature on heterogeneous …rms (Melitz, 2003; , higher productivity …rms are more likely to export and are more likely to be multinational and have a lower probability of leaving the market than lower productivity …rms. Since a …rm's productivity originates from …rm-speci…c assets in, for instance, technology and managerial skills, and the services of these assets can be moved across locations of a …rm at low cost, the mother …rm's productivity may in ‡uence the decision to divest. As productivity is heterogeneous across industries, we measure a …rm's productivity relative to its two-digit industry's average productivity. Firm z is said to have a higher than industry average labor productivity if
L a j and h =L h is the two-digit industry's average productivity in Sweden for the industry l to which …rm z belongs. Note that since our industry level information is from Sweden only, we use only the Swedish portion of sales to calculate this measure.
Industry-speci…c variables
Industry characteristics that we use in this paper are somewhat broader compared some used in previous empirical work due to the unavailability of sector level sunk costs and concentration ratios for a number of countries that the Swedish multinationals operate in.
Sunk Costs: In general, high industry sunk costs should reduce the likelihood of a¢liate exit, although it is less clear what the e¤ect is for a divestiture. Hopenhayn (1992) shows that exit probability of existing plants in a sector is low if there exist high entry barriers or sunk costs since they face less …erce competition than otherwise, leading to hysteresis (Dixit and Pyndick, 1994) . Regulation: The degree of competition should have an e¤ect on divestiture decisions as it directly a¤ects an a¢liate's pro…ts. On the one hand, higher market concentration may lead to higher markups in a sector, which should reduce the exit probability (Audretsch, 1995 Chilean data, …nd no signi…cant impact of concentration on the probability of exit. As a proxy for concentration we use the potential costs of anti-competitive regulation in certain non-manufacturing sectors for sectors in the economy that use the output of non-manufacturing sectors as intermediate inputs in the production process. Although this is not a direct measure of concentration, it varies by industry and country and thus has broader international coverage than standard measures of concentration such as a Her…ndahl index or a …rm-concentration ratio. As we do have information on which industry …rms belong to, we will in addition use industry speci…c e¤ects. To measure income and size, we use the log of real gross domestic product of country m , GDP. To measure openness to trade, we use the variable 'Trade Openness' which is the log of trade volume divided by GDP in country m. To control for the education level of the work force, we use the log of average years of secondary or tertiary education attained in country m, Skill:We also control for the productivity of the host country with the log of the capital-labor ratio in country m, K-L Ratio. 10 Finally, some speci…cations will only use country-speci…c e¤ects.
Country-speci…c variables

Results
We start of by providing information on country and industry coverage as well as simple summary statistics for our basic sample of a¢liates. As can be seen from Table 1 , Swedish MNCs have operations all around the world and operate in all the major industries ( Table 2 ). Recall that while the unit of observation is the a¢liate and the basic question is what determines the survival or divestiture of an a¢liate over a …ve-year period, many of these determinants are at the …rm, industry or country level or a combination thereof. Therefore, we group the variables used in the analysis by their level of aggregation. Table 3 provides some basic summary statistics for the sample. We have at most 1559 usable observations. Of these, 110 are a¢liates that exited between 1998 and 2003 while the rest did not.
Preliminaries
Before going into a detailed econometric analysis, we provide a couple of pieces of simpler information to characterize the data and the determinants of a¢liate divestiture. We start with a mean-di¤erence analysis of our data. Table 4 compares the means of characteristics for retained and divested a¢liates. Note that some of these can be computed at the country or regional level, while others only exist globally. and indicate whether the means are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent at the ten and …ve percent levels, respectively. We …rst note that divested a¢liates tend to be larger, as measured by the number of employees, consistent with Proposition 1 (i). However, as with all the raw numbers in this table, we caution that only a conditional analysis will show whether these unconditional di¤erences hold up once we control for the full set of determinants of a¢liate divestiture.
Proposition 1 (ii) also asserts that an a¢liate is more likely to be divested if it is small relative to other a¢liates. Since it is not obvious how this should be measured, we construct two di¤erent measures, as discussed above. One is the size of an a¢liate relative to the average size of a …rm's a¢liates ('Relative Size'); the other is the share of this a¢liate in the a¢liate network of a …rm, either in the same country or region ('Size Share'). In this simple mean comparison, the two measures give con ‡icting results. According to the 'Relative Size' measure, divested a¢liates are larger (recall, this measure is in natural logs), but the 'Size Share' indicates that divested a¢liates are signi…cantly smaller relative to other existing a¢liates in the same country and the same region. It is important to note that Proposition 1 implies that in any regression, both absolute a¢liate size as well as relative a¢liate size must be included simultaneously. The two are of course also related. When the absolute size of an a¢liate increases, its relative size rises as well, holding other a¢liates' sizes constant.
Many …rm characteristics di¤er signi…cantly between retained and divested plants. Divestiture is more likely when there exists another a¢liate and when the number and size of these other a¢liates is large. This is consistent with the hypothesis that restructuring takes place and the divestiture of an a¢liate is not symptomatic of general troubles faced by the …rm. This is underscored by the fact that a sale is also more likely when there is an acquisition elsewhere, whether in the same country, the same region, or anywhere globally within the same …rm. At the same time, restructuring does not appear to be limited to one a¢liate, but a¤ects multiple ones as divestiture is also more likely when there is divestiture elsewhere, again regardless of how we de…ne the relevant geographic boundary. Finally, …rms of divested a¢liates are relatively less productive than those of retained ones.
Interestingly, neither industry nor country characteristics appear signi…cantly di¤erent for retained and divested plants. For the latter in particular, however, we note that this may simply be due to the much smaller degree of variation as all a¢liates located in the same country face the same values for any of the country level variables.
Next, we turn to a visual examination of plant sales at the …rm, industry and country level. First, we de…ne a compact measure of a¢liate divestiture, namely the divestiture rate, at the …rm, industry and country level. 11 The divestiture rate at the …rm level is the number of divested a¢liates of a multinational …rm in a certain country divided by the total number of a¢liates of the same …rm in the same country, including both those retained and those sold. Figure 2 shows the divestiture rate drawn against their share of foreign sales, which can be viewed as the degree of internationalization of Swedish MNCs. As …rms get more actively involved in foreign operations they start having access to external and internal resources to overcome negative shocks. However, these …rms may also be "footloose" and have the ‡exibility to close or sell a plant. Figure 2 shows that as the foreign sales share rises, the divestiture rate falls. For example, among Swedish MNCs with a more than 80% foreign sales share, 58 a¢liates were divested between 1998 and 2003. There were 508 retained a¢liates of these …rms in the same countries, giving an divestiture rate of 58/(58+508)=10%. In other words, 90% of the a¢liates of Swedish MNCs with a very high degree of internationalization remained between 1998 and 2003. This preliminary result goes against the footloose MNCs arguments in the literature. Figure 3 illustrates the divestiture rate at the industry level. In the automobile sector, for example, 32 left out of a total of 255 and thus the divestiture rate is 13%. In high sunk cost industries such as automobiles or fabricated metals the divestiture rates are low. However, there does not seem to exist a very clear pattern and further analysis is necessary.
Probit Results
We turn now to our probit results, which can be found in Tables 5-7 , as enumerated in (13) . We start o¤ simply in Table 5 by only including the variables suggested directly by the theoretical model, absolute and relative a¢liate size. Recall that Proposition 1 stipulates that (absolutely) larger a¢liates are more likely to be divested, but those that are small relative to other a¢liates in a …rm's network. We measure this relative size either relative to the average size of an a¢liate or relative to the size of the a¢liate network in the same country or the same region. The results in Columns (1)-(3) are as predicted by theory. Divestiture is more likely the larger the a¢liate, but the smaller it is relative to other a¢liates. Since the measure of relative size does not a¤ect the results, we will subsequently focus on results using the 'Relative Size' variable. We emphasize at this point already that the signs and signi…cance of the two central variables remain robust to the inclusion of other controls, as discussed subsequently.
In Figure 4 , we translate these estimates to the to the simple model with two a¢liates in Section 3. Using speci…cation (i) in Table 5 (without calculating marginal e¤ects) the probabality to divest a¢liate a 1 is Pr(Divest a 1 = 1jsize a 1 ; rel_size a 1 ) = 3:6 + 0:41size a j 0:26rel_size a j . We then let the size of these two a¢liates run from 1 to 6000 employees and calculate size a 1 and rel_size a 1 over this range using (14) and (15) . The resulting probabality to divest a 1 is shown as the surface in Figure 4 .
Several things can be noted. Holding the size of a¢liate a 2 constant at the average number of emplyees in the data (255 employees) and increasing the number of employees in a¢liate a 1 , increases the probabality of divesting a 1 . This is consistent with Proposition 1(i), which conjectures that the acquiring …rm -in order to recover transaction costs -will be interested in targets of higher quality (as measured by larger size). However, the increase in the probability to divest a 1 is decreasing in the size of a 2 . The concavity in the probabality to divest comes in part from the functional form of the size variables but also re ‡ects Proposition1(ii) in that the MNC will want to sell the least productive a¢liate in order to invest in the more productive one.
To illustrate the latter e¤ect more clearly, we then hold the size of a¢liate a 1 constant at the average number of employees in the data (255 employees) and then increase the number of employees in a¢liate a 2 . As can be seen, making the a¢liate a 2 larger will also increase the probabality of divesting a 1 . An increase in the size of a 2 -and hence a decrease in the relative size of a 1 -signals that a 2 is the more productive one, and hence that a 2 is the a¢liate that the …rm will want to keep and invest in.
Let us now turn to controls calculated from the network of the …rm. The …rst set of additional variables included is the presence of another a¢liate as well as whether there is another divestiture or an acquisition. Column (4) shows results for measuring these at the country level, Column (5) at the regional level. Another divestiture robustly raises the probability of divestiture, but an acquisition elsewhere does not. This indicates that restructuring does not occur via shifting a¢liates around, but by generally decreasing the number of a¢liates. These are the …rst set of empirical results about global restructuring of a multinational without ignoring plant divestitures.
Replacing the dummy for the presence of another a¢liate with the number of other a¢liates does not change the result with respect to other acquisitions and divestitures, although the number of a¢liates does not appear to matter for the divestment decision, only whether there remains a presence in a country. As a …nal check of the robustness of our central results, Columns (8) and (9) include both measures of relative size and both measures of the presence of other a¢liates. Absolute a¢liate size remains robustly positively correlated with divestiture, relative size negatively. Divestiture still begets divestiture, but acquisition elsewhere does not.
In Table 6 , we successively add other …rm, industry and country level variables. The basic variables that proved robust in the previous set of results is included every time. For the variables that can be computed at either the regional or the country level, the latter was chosen. None of the results would change if we instead chose the regional level ones.
The degree of internationality is negatively correlated with divestiture, as expected, although it is not consistently statistically signi…cant. 12 The industry level variables, on the other hand, do not show any signi…cance. This could be because there is less variation at that level. Including the regulation measure (in Column (3)) reduces the number of observations signi…cantly, since it is only available for OECD countries, eliminating most developing countries from the sample. Since it also turns out to be statistically insigni…cant, as in Alvarez and Görg (2009), indicating no major impact of concentration on divestiture, we omit it in subsequent regressions.
Country level variables show some statistical signi…cance. When they are included, standard errors are adjusted for clustering. Divestitures are somewhat less likely in larger markets. Greater openness to trade weakly appears to raise the likelihood of an a¢liate sale, although replacing this variable with a market access measure results in no signi…cance of the coe¢cient. Other country characteristics, including capital and labor endowments, results of which are not shown for space reasons, are not statistically signi…cant.
In Table 7 , regressions (1)- (3) include various types of …xed e¤ects. Naturally, when we include these, we have to omit some variables. For example, the inclusion of country …xed e¤ects in column (1) necessitates the omission of all country level variables as we have no time variation in the sample. Nonetheless, all prior results hold. Likewise, the inclusion of industry or region …xed e¤ects changes none of the basic results, making us con…dent of their robustness. Finally, regression (4) includes an additional dummy for the …rm that has the most a¢liate divestitures in the sample. While this weakens some results, for example other divestitures are no longer signi…cant, many of the results hold up. In particular, the absolute and relative a¢liate size remain signi…cant with their signs as predicted from the model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the decision of a multinational …rm to close or divest a foreign plant. We drew on conclusions from a straightforward model building on Berg et al (2012) in which the primary motive to divest an a¢liate is to …nance other investments in the network of the MNC.
Using data on the global operations of Swedish MNCs, we were able to analyze the divestiture decision in the context of …rms' complex location strategies that involve all possible locations. This is in contrast to the existing literature that has focused on …rm operations in a single country to study the characteristics that a¤ect the survival probability of plants.
In line with conclusions from our model, we …nd that larger a¢liates are more likely to be divested and these a¢liates are small relative to the other operations of the …rm in the same country or region. These two results show that transaction costs matter and exit from a market is the product of a complex restructuring e¤ort within the multinational. Furthermore, our results indicate that a¢liates of more productive, more internationally engaged MNCs are less likely to be divested. The latter may be explained by the fact that having access to a large production network makes MNCs less vulnerable to negative shocks.
Our …ndings suggest that a number of country characteristics matter. A¢liates are more likely to be sold in small markets and in those with low GDP per capita. The …nding that a higher level of education increases the odds in favor of divestments may be due to this measure acting as a proxy for labor costs, which negatively a¤ect plant operations. Better access to foreign markets reduces the probability of divesting, as expected, and in accordance with the observation that MNCs account for a large share of global trade.
There are important and novel policy implications from the results. The lack of evidence on the footloose nature of multinational …rms suggests that successful e¤orts by countries to attract them may be a good long-run strategy. The importance of foreign market access underscores the importance of complementary policies, i.e. not only those focused on investment, but also on trade. Finally, it is in countries' best interest to attract experienced multinationals with large international networks as they are more likely to weather negative shocks. While we have linked plant divestiture to a large number of plant, …rm, industry and country characteristics, there are several extensions of this work that are worth pursuing. Firstly, the model can be extended to more than two a¢liates to address synergies or network e¤ects. Secondly, in the empirical part one could link divestiture to …rm characteristics and the …rm's a¢liate network in prior years. This is in principle doable as the survey of Swedish MNCs has been carried out every few years since 1965. However, only a subset of the responding …rms in 2003 were surveyed in earlier years, and similarly, a number of …rms that were surveyed earlier are not in the 2003 sample. Thus, the sample size for such an exercise will be somewhat smaller. Notes: Variables as de…ned in the text. An empty cell indicates that the level of (dis-)aggregation is not applicable. For example, there is no country and regional detail on size. A *, ** indicate that the means are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from each other at least with a p-value of 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. 
